Handbook of Health Economics by Rutten, F.F.H. (Frans) et al.
Journal of Health Economics 20 (2001) 855–879
Book review
Handbook of Health Economics
Frans Rutten∗, Han Bleichrodt, Werner Brouwer,
Marc Koopmanschap, Erik Schut
Department of Health Policy and Management, Institute for Medical Technology Assessment,
Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Received 1 June 2001; accepted 6 June 2001
1. Introduction
Editors and authors should be complimented for their impressive attempt to provide a
fair account of the state-of-the-art in health economics. To review such an extensive work
in a short time span, we decided to select certain chapters for more in depth study. This
selection was based on our areas of expertise under the restriction that all major research
areas distinguished in the handbook should be covered.
Before turning to the review of the separate chapters, let us first make some general
comments about the handbook. An important first question is whether all relevant research
areas are covered and whether this has been done in a balanced way. Of course, exhaustive
coverage in one book is unattainable for a large area like health economics. Rather the
question is that regarding balance and possible lack of bias. In that respect, the book focuses
on the US literature and health care system with 24 chapters written by US authors and only
11 by European and Canadian authors. The more traditional economic areas are generally
covered by the US authors, emphasising a neo-classical rather than an institutional paradigm,
and boundary topics like ‘equity’ and the ‘measurement of health’ are covered by the non-US
authors. This structure both reflects the contributions in the health economics literature and
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the large variation in US health care institutions, and is only troublesome in some chapters
as suggested below.
More worrying is the neglect of problems in low-income countries and the work on
system analysis (performance indicators), health care finance (role of user fees in developing
countries, public–private mix, medical savings accounts), prevention and health promotion
(early child development programs), and on the cost-effectiveness of specific interventions in
these countries (compare the references in WHO, 2000). Furthermore, while ample attention
is given to the demand side of the health care market (parts 2, 3 and 5 on demand, insurance
and medical care market), the extensive literature on health care supply (production and
cost functions, labour market, manpower planning, etc.) is not considered. More specific
remarks on topics missed will be made in the detailed review of chapters.
The editors use a schematic structure by Williams (1987) to explain the organisation of
the book (see Fig. 1). This scheme distinguishes an ‘engine room’ of four key areas (A–D)
Fig. 1. A schematic of Health Economics. Reprinted from the Handbook of Health Economics, Vol 1a & 1b, A.J.
Culyer and J.P. Newhouse (Eds.), p4, 2000, with permission from Elsevier Science.
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and four peripheral boxes (E–H) representing empirical fields of application. The contents
of all boxes are covered by several chapters. Chapters in turn often belong to more than one
box.
Somewhat surprisingly, the seven parts in which the book is partitioned are not arranged
according to these boxes. It is difficult to grasp the logic of the order in which these seven
parts are presented and the way chapters dealing with a topic are arranged in these parts. The
first part considered in volume 1A is not the best choice to achieve focus and homogeneity. A
motley collection of topics is treated under the general heading ‘overviews and paradigms’,
among which ‘international comparison’, ‘normative economics’ and ‘cost-effectiveness
analysis’. A more logical order would be to start with the characteristics of health care that
require specific attention from an economic perspective (asymmetric information, physician
agency now in part 3) and then consider the supply of health care (mostly lacking), the
demand for health care (now part 2), health insurance (now part 3), health care markets
(now part 5 and partly part 3), market regulation (part 6) and the analysis of systems (now
partly in parts 1 and 9 on equity of systems). It is equally unclear why part 4 on ‘specific
populations’ is placed between ‘insurance’ and ‘markets’ and why ‘health habits’ (part 7)
precedes ‘health’ (part 8).
Relatively little attention is paid in the various chapters to the impact of health economic
work on health policy and practice. The editors in their introductory chapter rightly sug-
gest that this impact has been large both by successfully introducing economic concepts
to policy makers and practitioners and by supporting policies at all levels of health care
decision-making. Furthermore, examples of an institutional role for health economics can
be provided, such as the requirement to use economic evaluation studies for policy decisions
on the introduction or reimbursement of new medical technologies. Where applicable, we
will consider the impact of health economics on health care in the detailed chapter reviews
below.
The target readership for the book is the typical UK masters student embarking on a
masters degree in health economics or the US first year graduate in a doctoral program.
They will probably find some chapters less accessible than others, but will value the com-
prehensiveness and wealth of the handbook. Also the index seems to work well for those
needing a quick update on a specific topic.
2. Overviews and paradigms
Chapter 1 on international comparison focuses on the explanation of international varia-
tion in health care expenditure and reports on the well-known high explanatory power of ag-
gregate income with reported elasticities of unity or slightly higher. The authors, Gerdtham
and Jönsson, give a thorough overview of the macroeconometric work in this area. They
explain the various models used and discussed their appropriateness in the estimation of
the relationship between health care expenditure and several explanatory variables, includ-
ing aggregate income. Gerdtham and Jönsson distinguish between first-generation studies
(cross-section bivariate and multivariate regressions) and second-generation studies (panel
data analysis and unit root and cointegration analyses) and discuss the use of fixed versus
random effects models and ways to correct for the presence of non-stationary variables
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(with deterministic or stochastic trends). These sections somewhat overlap with chapter
6 on health econometrics. There is still debate on whether non-stationarity is actually a
problem in the OECD data sets, which are primarily used for these studies.
The results of applying these sophisticated techniques are somewhat disappointing and are
presented with many caveats. Among the non-institutional variables, the effect of aggregate
income is dominant and other variables like age structure, unemployment and female labour
force participation are insignificant. Among the institutional variables, the use of primary
care as gatekeeper, the reimbursement model (typology OECD), and public sector provision
decrease expenditure, while fee for service increases expenditure relative to capitation.
Gerdtham and Jönsson suggest that the discussed econometric studies should be better
founded in theory and suggest to explore a wider macroeconomic framework. In addition,
new variables may be considered like government budget deficits and tax subsidies of health
insurance.
The studies considered in this chapter address positive questions, but recently an important
attempt to take a more normative approach towards comparative studies of health care
systems was taken by the World Health Organisation in the World Health Report 2000. The
WHO study differs in many respects from the studies discussed by Gerdtham and Jönsson. It
comprises all countries (at the cost of inaccurate data from many non-OECD countries, see
for instance Williams, 2001) and data are collected to measure more institutional variables.
The analysis in the WHO-study is a significant departure from the studies discussed by
Gerdtham and Jönsson and looks like a promising extension of this area in health economics.
In chapter 2, Hurley shows the implications of the normative framework used for the
analysis and conclusions concerning the operation of health care systems, market failure
and health care insurance. A central element is the debate on the appropriate assumptions
and methods to be used in normative analysis of health care, focusing on the welfarist
and other, for example extra-welfarist, positions in this debate. As key elements in the
welfarist methodology, Hurley mentions individual sovereignty, welfarism (focus on utility),
willingness to pay as a monetary metric for utility, market allocation as a reference standard,
and a separation of efficiency and equity, with a focus on efficiency.
First Hurley concentrates on the relationship between the view on efficiency and the
normative framework used. He summarises criticism on welfare economics, such as the
assumption of individual sovereignty, the validity of willingness to pay and whether utility
should be the key element in the social welfare function. Hurley does not exactly circum-
scribe the term extra-welfarism, but mentions as its main ingredient the argument that health
instead of utility should be the most relevant outcome for normative analysis in the health
sector.
Hurley gives an excellent overview of possible frameworks of analysis. He distinguishes
five types of social welfare functions: three individualistic types (sum maximising, Pare-
tian and Bergson Samuelson) and two non-individualistic (decision-maker and Mooney’s
communitarian approach). He combines these five functions with the two most prominent
paradigms on the outcome of interest, welfarist and extra-welfarist, producing a total of
10 possible normative approaches. This overview is very helpful in judging the norma-
tive assumptions of health economic studies. It shows for example that the communitarian
approach, which explores the relationship between individual and societal preferences, in
principle could be applied in a welfarist and in a non-welfarist framework.
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Hurley proceeds with the question to what extent health care is different and to what
degree welfarists and extra-welfarists have different views on this subject. He shows that
welfarists stress demand as a key concept, whereas need is crucial for extra-welfarists.
When alleviating the consumers burden of informational asymmetry, the welfarists rely
somewhat more on providing additional information, while extra-welfarists more often
tend to advocate supply-side regulation. With respect to moral hazard Hurley shows that
the welfare implications of cost sharing may depend on the assumed mix of reduction of
necessary and unnecessary care.
In a separate paragraph, Hurley discusses equity. After defining several standard equity
notions, he inevitably arrives at some sort of social welfare function as analytical framework.
For the difficult tasks of defining the functions weights, his first suggestions are the fair
innings example of Williams and the DALYs of Murray and Lopez (1996).
Discussing economic evaluation of health care programs, Hurley shows that welfarists
and extra-welfarists have divergent opinions on the very important question how to value
the extension of a human life: monetary or non-monetary, based on individual or societal
preferences, including or excluding non-medical costs, etc. A related, equally important,
question of course is whether the CUA threshold should be allowed to vary among individ-
uals, according to their preferences.
He concludes by stating that normative economic analysis of the health care sector is
inescapably a form of social ethics, dependent on our analytic and empirical understanding
of social values.
Chapter 4 by Garber provides a selection of methodological issues related to cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) of health care. The author deliberately uses a welfare economic
framework to address the question whether decision-making based on cost-effectiveness
analysis will lead to a distribution of resources that is desirable in terms of social welfare.
This choice clearly limits the scope of the chapter but is on the other hand helpful in judging
the implications of his conclusions.
In the first part, Garber clarifies the difference between average and incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios. He clearly prefers incremental ratios, illustrated by examples of choos-
ing between multiple alternatives and the role of (extended) dominance. He does not ad-
dress the possibility of an inefficient starting point from which decisions, based solely
on incremental cost-effectiveness results, could be sub-optimal. In such a case, average
cost-effectiveness ratios as compared to the null situation may be sensible complementary
information, see Murray et al. (2000).
Garber states that the league table approach is a poor guide for rational medical choices,
because studies listed in the table may use different methodologies, the ranking of inter-
ventions is highly dependent on the specific programmes listed, and the table does not
show how much we should spend. Instead he presents the Garber–Phelps approach. The
health care allocation problem is viewed here as a simple von Neumann Morgenstern utility
maximisation problem, the first order conditions of which may be expressed in a form that
serves as a cost-effectiveness threshold. The value of the threshold depends on the inclu-
sion of unrelated future medical costs. Meltzer extended this approach showing that future
non-medical consumption should also be included for programs prolonging life. Garber
concludes that decisions based on CEA may be optimal from a welfarist view, but only if
costs and outcomes are measured properly, including unrelated future medical costs.
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If quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as used in studies cannot be interpreted as utilities,
the welfare economic properties of CEA may be less favourable. Garber states that if QALYs
measure only health-related quality of life, as often occurs, and omit to measure relevant
non-health aspects as consumption, financial status and general well-being, the adverse
effects of a poor health state may be underestimated. On the other hand, Garber is pragmatic
in admitting that even flawed measures of utility can provide reasonable prioritisations of
programs and are clearly preferable to decision-making ignoring costs and health effects of
policy alternatives altogether.
With respect to the proper measurement of costs in cost-effectiveness analysis, Garber
unfortunately does not mention the methodological questions concerning time costs and
productivity costs (of both patients and informal caregivers). Instead, he focuses on the
question whether to include fixed medical costs into the costs of health care programmes.
Garber states that the advice of the panel on cost-effectiveness in cost and medicine (Gold
et al., 1996) to exclude fixed costs can be very problematic in case of substantial fixed costs
or research and development costs. He argues convincingly that using marginal cost figures
in cases that market prices are clearly higher than marginal costs (for example in the market
for medications) may not be sensible.
Although Garber is quite critical about CEA from a welfarist perspective, he thinks that
CEA can be a useful aid to decision-making in health care. Exploration of its welfare
economic foundations may help to resolve issues in the analysis of costs and quality of life.
In chapter 5, Phelps addresses the issue of incomplete information in the health care
market. Incomplete information is especially prominent in health care because insurance
blunts consumers’ incentives to search for lower prices and quality and there are limitations
on advertising. Furthermore, systems to protect property rights on process innovation are
lacking causing insufficient investment in the production and dissemination of information.
The extent to which search behaviour is discouraged by insurance depends on the type of
insurance. Coinsurance decreases the incentive to search, but for instance the payment of a
fixed amount per event preserves incentives. An instructive overview of models to explain
incomplete search behaviour is presented. These models suggest that a higher fraction of
consumers who are shopping leads to lower prices and if a sufficiently large number shop,
the price will be at the competitive (minimum average) cost level. Because health insurance
both lowers demand elasticity and also reduces the number of searchers (if the costs of
searching are not covered) the latter situation will not easily occur in the health care market
and prices will generally vary.
On the supply side, there seems to be disagreement about the production function among
health care providers as may be concluded from observed practice variation. Phelps convinc-
ingly argues that neither income and price-elasticities nor substitution nor severity of illness
nor patient preferences are likely to explain the huge variation. Rather doctor variables like
‘schools of thought’, ‘local practice’ and ‘styles’ may explain variation in physician re-
source use. Phelps prefers to term these doctor variables ‘incomplete information about
the efficacy of treatment’, assuming that the provider is a good agent for the patient. The
increasing role of practice guidelines and the easy access to information about efficacy of
treatment can be expected to diminish this information gap. Other supply side variables (e.g.
financial incentives), however, may add to this variation in providers’ behaviour, although
the specific studies quoted control for differences in fee schedules. The actual welfare loss
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resulting from practice variation is roughly estimated to be of the same order of magnitude
as the welfare loss associated with perverse incentives in health insurance.
Finally, the (lack of) incentives to close the information gap are discussed. Compared
with the incentives in the market for pharmaceutical products, the incentives to invest in new
treatment strategies and the dissemination of these are weak, as meaningful property rights
cannot be defined. Public action seems required to perform studies to improve treatment
and spread information on best treatment options. The enormous welfare loss supports the
public good nature of such information and provides an argument for increased investment
in, among others, economic evaluation of treatment strategies.
Chapter 6 by Jones is on health econometrics. Jones’ central thesis is that there has
been a wealth of applied econometric work in health economics over the past decade. This
wealth of research reflects that health economics is a rich area for using microeconometric
methods because of the importance of individual heterogeneity, selection problems and
latent variables, and the availability of large, often longitudinal, individual level datasets.
The chapter reviews much of the applied work focusing on the use of individual level data
and microeconometric techniques. The emphasis lies on model specification and estimation
techniques, although frequent reference is made to diagnostic tests.
The chapter is structured around the nature of the data to be analyzed. The general
structure of each section is to start with an intuitive discussion of the problem at hand
then to move to estimation techniques, and rounding off with a discussion of applications
in health economics. Section 2 discusses the general problem whether it is possible to
identify causal effects from empirical data. Jones argues that two important problems here
are self-selection bias and unobservable individual heterogeneity that is correlated with
the regressors (heterogeneity bias). These problems have led to three different estimation
approaches: the use of longitudinal data which allow to control for individual effects that
remain constant over time, the use of instrumental variables and the use of selectivity
models.
Section 3 is on qualitative-dependent variables. The section starts with the well-known
case where the dependent variable is binary and logit and probit models are used. Jones then
discusses successively the cases where the dependent variable is multinomial but ordered,
for example, measures of self-assessed health, and where it is multinomial and unordered,
for example the choice of an insurance plan. Several complications are discussed, often
related to selectivity bias, and appropriate estimation techniques are given.
Section 4 treats limited dependent variables and the three approaches that have been used
to model these: two-part, selectivity, and hurdle models. The choice of model ultimately
depends on the nature of the data and Jones gives an instructive taxonomy of cases. The
remainder of the section discusses the three approaches. The choice between a two-part
and a selectivity approach to model the demand for medical care has provoked a vigorous
debate in the health economics literature. Jones gives a balanced overview of this debate.
The problems of heterogeneity bias and endogeneity bias, i.e. the case where the ex-
planatory variables themselves are endogenous are central in Section 5. These biases are
frequently encountered in studies of health production. Problems are often compounded by
the presence of latent variables, such as health, which can lead to selection bias. Section
6 discusses models for hierarchical and longitudinal data. Multilevel models are used to
analyze data that fall naturally into hierarchical structures, such as outcome measures of
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patients in different hospitals. An important choice in multilevel models is whether higher
level effects should be treated as fixed or as random. Jones gives an elucidating account of
the pros and cons of these two approaches. A problem with longitudinal health data is the
simultaneous existence of unobservable heterogeneity and the need to use non-linear mod-
els to deal with qualitative and limited dependent variables. These problems are particularly
acute in dynamic models that include lagged variables.
Sections 7 and 8 are on the related topics of count data regression and survival analysis.
Count data regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is a non-negative integer
count, such as the number of GP visits. The basic count data model is the Poisson model.
Problems arise if the frequency of zeros in count data is large and if there is heterogeneity
bias. Survival or duration analysis models the time elapsed until an event occurs. The most
obvious application is to mortality rates. The common duration model is Cox proportional
hazard model. Jones explains how to deal with heterogeneity bias which may cause biased
individual estimates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of stochastic frontier models,
used to analyze the efficiency of health care organizations.
The chapter is not for the faint-hearted. The number of topics treated in a relatively
modest amount of pages is impressive. Moreover, Jones treats not only techniques but also
gives extensive coverage of empirical studies. At places, too much space is devoted to
empirical studies and Jones looses himself in uninstructive detail. This occasionally goes at
the expense of the discussion of techniques which is generally rather terse and not always
easy to follow. The chapter is extremely useful as a source of reference. As such, it offers
convincing testimony of the diversity of applied health econometric work over the past
decade.
3. Demand and reimbursement for medical services
Chapter 9 by McGuire discusses physician agency. Ideally, physicians should be perfect
agents for patients, providing complete and unbiased information to the patients, who then
may decide in all sovereignty on what to do (as described in chapter 8 by Zweifel and
Manning). However, in real life physicians may not always act like that. They have the
opportunity and (as economists believe) the incentives to be less than perfect agents. This
chapter critically reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on what is commonly
known as ‘physician agency’, comprising studies of physician market power, behaviour
and motives. The goal of the chapter is to ‘draw on the contributions of many writers
to develop a working model of physicians that can handle the key elements of physician
and patient interaction and the associated institutions’ (p. 463). The chapter is built in
such a way that it develops this working model stepwise, starting with the simplest model
of the physician market (a straightforward demand and supply model) and subsequently
considering physician behaviour with complete information, uncertainty about treatment
effects and asymmetric information, physician-induced demand and physician objectives
other than income maximisation. The discussions of these issues have some overlap with
parts of the chapters by Cutler and Zeckhauser [11] and by Chalkley and Malcomson [15].
The chapter does not provide an introduction to the general principle–agent theory, which
would have been helpful for the intended readership. In addition, there is only little attention
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for the question of how to improve physician agency and the role and goals of patients in
this principle–agent relationship.
McGuire starts by providing some information on prices, income of physicians, supply
and specialisation of physicians, which is interpreted in a simple demand–supply frame-
work. The figures presented are all from the US, other countries are occasionally mentioned
only to contrast them to the US situation. McGuire explains that even in a monopolistic
competitive market with complete information physicians can influence the quantity de-
manded by patients, due to non-retradability of physician services and non-contractible in-
put (quality or effort) of physicians. Subsequently, the effects of uncertainty about efficacy
of treatment and asymmetric information are considered. Here, another way of influencing
patient demand is introduced: persuasion. Persuasion can be used by physicians in order
to increase demand and thus maximise income. In that light, explicit attention is paid to
physician-induced demand (PID), one of the most discussed and examined issues in health
economics. McGuire points out that the ample empirical evidence of PID needs close ex-
amination, as results can also be interpreted in other ways. One of the problems of course
is the difficulty of empirically separating persuasion from the non-contractible features of
physician services quality and effort. The same problem is present in empirically investi-
gating the extent of PID due to defensive medicine, which is put forward by McGuire as a
relatively new source for PID.
McGuire subsequently moves away from income maximisation and discusses other physi-
cian objectives, such as complying with medical ethics and seeking the patient’s best in-
terests. Most attention is focused on the alternative objective of a target income. The target
income hypothesis is often used to explain PID (demand may be induced in order to en-
sure an acceptable income-level for the physician). McGuire argues that the target income
hypothesis stems from the behavioural economic stream of literature, but subsequently
tries to formalise it in a utility maximising framework. He argues that target income be-
haviour and income maximisation lie at opposite ends of a spectrum of income effects:
“When income effects are all that matter around a certain point, physicians act so as to
pursue a target. When income effects are absent, physicians maximise income.” (p. 524).
The empirical evidence presented does not provide definite answers to support or reject
the presence of income effects. Furthermore, McGuire argues that the target income hy-
pothesis is implausible for two reasons. First, in a setting with multiple payers there is
an infinite number of combinations of quantities to reach the target. McGuire does not,
however, explain why physicians should bother about finding a unique solution for reach-
ing the target. Second, he contends that it is difficult to explain how and why targets are
set. Here, McGuire largely ignores behavioural economic insights, which might have been
helpful to explain targeting behaviour. Behavioural economics focuses on understanding
and describing behaviour that deviates from the behavioural assumptions in neo-classical
economics. Several concepts from the behavioural economic literature could prove helpful
here. For example, reference points for income may be determined by income-levels of
peer groups. Also, diminishing sensitivity may cause the marginal effects for changes close
to the reference level to be greater than those for changes further away from the reference
point, while mental accounting denotes the idea that persons group financial flows into
categories, each with an explicit budget — or using another term: target (e.g. Rabin, 1998;
Thaler, 1999).
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4. Insurance markets, managed care and contracting
Part 3 of the handbook is devoted to insurance markets, managed care and contracting.
Cutler and Zeckhauser set the stage in chapter 11 by providing a thorough anatomy of health
insurance. From the theoretical and empirical literature on (health) insurance they draw five
important ‘anatomical lessons’.
1. Health insurance involves a fundamental tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate
incentives to reduce moral hazard (through coinsurance arrangements) and supplier-
induced demand (through managed care).
2. Principal–agent problems between health insurers and health care providers have pro-
voked an integration of insurance and provision, intended to align incentives.
3. Competition among health insurers is a mixed blessing because it is accompanied by
adverse selection. Adverse selection induces healthy people to opt for less generous
health insurance and encourages health insurers to adopt measures that deter the sick
from enrolling.
4. Because health insurance is contracted for annually, it does not provide protection against
falling into a worse risk class. The absence of a market for intertemporal health insurance
results in an important welfare loss that is likely to expand as the ability to predict future
health status increases.
5. It is still unclear which approaches to health insurance promote health in the most
cost-efficient manner.
The anatomical lessons are largely based on the anatomy of the US private health in-
surance system. Although Cutler and Zeckhauser begin their chapter with a paragraph on
health insurance structures in developed nations, their discussion of other countries than the
US is confined to less than half a page. The focus on the US health insurance system is un-
derstandable, given the authors’ background and the abundance of excellent theoretical and
empirical research into the functioning of the US health insurance system. Nevertheless, the
almost complete negligence of health insurance systems in other countries is an important
omission, because the health insurance system in the US differs significantly from those
in other developed nations. Most countries either have a social health insurance system or
a tax-financed health care system. Tax-financed health care systems, in which health care
is purchased by the government, are extensively discussed by Chalkley and Malcomson in
chapter 15. By contrast, however, the handbook barely pays attention to social health in-
surance systems, in which health services are purchased by social health insurance bodies.
As we will argue below, social health insurance systems provide solutions to some of the
problems of private health insurance markets as formulated in the anatomical lessons.
We will discuss some of the anatomical lessons in more detail. In the first lesson, the
authors explain that full insurance for health care is not optimal because more generous
insurance increases consumer-initiated or supplier-induced moral hazard. The authors re-
view the empirical evidence on moral hazard and conclude that “essentially all economists
accept that traditional health insurance leads to moderate moral hazard in demand”, while
“the demand elasticities in the Rand experiment have become the standard in the literature”
(p. 584). They then discuss the implications of these findings for the optimal design of a
health insurance policy. Simulated optimal health insurance policies typically have much
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higher coinsurance rates (at least 25%) and stop-loss amounts (exceeding US$ 25,000) than
found in real world health insurance markets. The authors suspect that tax subsidies for
employment-based health insurance in the US are the main reason why real world policies
are more generous than optimal policies.
However, there is a number of other important reasons why the “optimal” insurance
policy might not be optimal. First, the use of the Rand estimates as the gold standard to
determine the optimal insurance policy is disputable. Although the Rand experiment is the
best designed health insurance experiment that has been (and probably will be) performed,
its results at the microlevel cannot be directly translated to the macrolevel of the health
care system. A large scale introduction of “optimal” insurance policies could reduce moral
hazard by much less than predicted by the experiment, because health care providers would
probably be able to offset part of the reduction of moral hazard by creating additional demand
for their services (Barer et al., 1979). Second, in a recent paper, Nyman (1999) explained
that the welfare loss due to moral hazard has been substantially overestimated, because a
crucial benefit of health insurance — providing access to otherwise unaffordable health care
— has been ignored. Because of this access value of health insurance, real world policies (as
well as the Rand experiment) usually include stop-loss provisions that are much lower than
those included in most “optimal” insurance policies (Blomqvist, 2001; Nyman, 2001). In
addition, studies that simulate optimal health insurance policies also ignore the presence of
strong altruistic preferences in health care. Aaron (1981) argues that people’s concern about
inequality is differentiated since they place different weights on inadequate consumption
of different commodities. Aaron argues that a preference for “commodity egalitarianism”
seems to apply to most health services. 1 The distributional effects of high coinsurance
rates are not neutral, but will especially harm the chronically ill and low-income groups. As
already noted by Arrow (1963), in health care markets efficiency and distributional issues
cannot be separated because the conditions for perfect competition cannot be fulfilled and
costless income redistribution is not feasible. Optimal coinsurance rates would be much
lower if one would include the externality of altruistic preferences in the analysis. Finally,
aside from the previous objections, “optimal” health insurance policies would only imply
optimality from a utilitarian perspective. Other distributional principles (e.g. egalitarian,
libertarian) would result in different designs of an optimal health insurance policy.
Cutler and Zeckhauser devote a substantial part of the chapter to the problem of adverse
selection. Adverse selection is defined as the phenomenon that “when plans can only charge
average prices, generous plans will disproportionately attract sicker people, and more mod-
erate plans will disproportionately attract healthier ones” (p. 607). Cutler and Zeckhauser
first summarize the seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) who show that in the
presence of two risk groups and asymmetric information, adverse selection will either re-
sult in a separating equilibrium with incomplete insurance coverage for low-risks or in no
equilibrium at all. The Rothschild–Stiglitz model with two risk types suggests that at least
some high risks will be in their most preferred plan while low-risks may be distorted into
1 In a subsequent discussion of adverse selection (lesson 3), Cutler and Zeckhauser themselves not only recognise
the presence of altruistic preferences but even assume that those preferences directly influence market performance.
Specifically, they argue that health plans do not charge individuals premiums based on their expected cost “since
it is widely believed that it is not fair to make people pay a lot more just because they are sick” (p. 607).
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less generous plans. However, Cutler and Zeckhauser show that this outcome may be re-
versed in situations with more than two risk groups. Either way, adverse selection results
in a welfare loss that the authors depict as an undesired side effect of competition in health
insurance markets. Two objections can be made to this conclusion, however. First, models
of adverse selection usually assume the absence of moral hazard. Keeping in mind the first
anatomical lesson, however, adverse selection may also generate a welfare gain insofar as
it urges people to buy less than complete coverage. Dionne and Doherty (1992) argue that
self-selection may help solve moral hazard problems as well as adverse selection prob-
lems. Second, contrary to what the authors suggest, adverse selection may not result from
competition but from regulation (Pauly, 1985). In a competitive health insurance market
where consumers are allowed to choose between policies with a high and a low deductible,
health insurers appear to be quite capable in eliminating most of the consumer information
surplus by risk rating (van de Ven and van Vliet, 1995). But health insurers are often not
allowed to risk rate since employers or governments force them to charge average premi-
ums for heterogeneous risk groups (van de Ven et al., 2000). 2 Premium rate restrictions
are typically imposed by employers or governments to enforce cross-subsidies between
risk groups, because such a cross-subsidization would not occur in a purely competitive
insurance market. Hence, the underlying problem of competition in health insurance is the
fact that risk rated premiums are generally considered to be an unfair outcome of unfettered
competition. Premium rate regulation, however, clearly is an imperfect way to mitigate this
unfavorable outcome of competition. Not only because it leads to adverse selection by the
insured, but, perhaps more importantly, because it also instigates cream skimming by the
insurer. As shown by van de Ven and Ellis in chapter 14, an adequate system of risk-adjusted
premium subsidies combined with ex-post risk sharing could effectively guarantee fairness
while reducing adverse and favorable selection in competitive health insurance markets.
The fourth anatomical lesson points at a major problem of private health insurance mar-
kets: the inability to offer insurance against becoming a high risk in the future. A market
for lifetime medical insurance is missing because future medical costs are highly unpre-
dictable and non-diversifiable, as a result of which insurers refuse to write insurance for
such risks. However, as pointed out by van de Ven et al. (2000), a system of risk-adjusted
premium subsidies cannot only address the problem of risk selection, but also the problem
of renewable insurance, because the future subsidy value can be adjusted to the change in
the individual’s risk characteristics.
The predominance of social health insurance in most developed nations might well be
explained by the fact that mandatory universal health insurance can solve the problems
of adverse selection (lesson 3), unfairness, and the non-existence of intertemporal insur-
ance (lesson 4). In addition, most social health insurance schemes to some extent rely on
user charges to reduce moral hazard and are accompanied with extensive supply-side gov-
ernment regulation to combat supplier-induced demand (lesson 1). In comparison with
social insurance, however, private health insurance offers more choice (except for the
sick), whereas competition among insurers might provide more incentives for efficiency
at the microlevel of the health care system. An increasing number of countries is gradually
2 To some extent risk raking may also be mitigated by transaction costs (Newhouse, 1996). In addition, Cutler
and Zeckhauser argue that fairness may play a role in curbing premium differentiation (see Footnote 1).
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replacing supply-side regulation by some form of regulated or managed competition to
include choice and incentives for efficiency into their social health insurance systems. In
chapter 14, van de Ven and Ellis explain why an adequate system of risk adjustment is in-
dispensable for attenuating problems of risk segmentation that threaten the effectiveness of
managed competition for resource allocation in health care. They also provide an overview
of the current practice of risk adjustment and risk sharing in 11 countries.
5. Specific populations
Why devote a chapter to the economics of mental health? Frank and McGuire give
a number of compelling arguments in chapter 16: mental illness is most prevalent and
disabling, it has the highest direct costs, indirect costs almost twice the direct costs, and
huge external effects (crime, accidents, child abuse and neglect, homelessness, etc.). It
has the highest proportion of patients undertreated and overtreated, the latter probably
being a typical US phenomenon. Insurance for care for mental health and substance abuse
(MH/SA) is often more limited than for general health care, but this may also be more true
for the US than for other countries. This limited coverage was inspired by the belief that
psychotherapy in particular is discretionary and the demand for this service rather elastic,
which was confirmed by both observational and experimental health insurance experiment
(Rand HIE) studies.
Generally, both supply-side rationing and demand-side cost sharing are applied and those
two should be balanced. Frank and McGuire show that maximising benefits over costs
implies that if managed care rationing is done efficiently, full coverage of mental health
services does not produce losses due to moral hazard and has the benefit of not imposing
financial risks. Furthermore, managed care allocation should be done such that the implied
costs per unit of output (e.g. cost per QALY) or the shadow price is equal across services
(compare chapter 4). Quite different contract arrangements exist in so-called ‘managed
behavioural health care’. This has been inspired by the inefficiently low levels of insur-
ance for behavioural health and by selection problems in the 1980s in the US. A typical
phenomenon here are ‘behavioural health carve-outs’, where the health insurance and/or
management function are separated out for MH/SA. The carve-out programs may dimin-
ish selection-related incentives as MH/SA is separated from the integrated health plans,
among which there is competition for the ‘good risks’. Disadvantages of such carve-out
programs may exist when ‘integrated care’ is better than ‘fragmented’ care and admin-
istrative costs and opportunities for cost-shifting and other forms of strategic behaviour
increase.
Finally Frank and McGuire point at the important role of public provision of inpatient
care for the most seriously ill, also inspired by public safety concerns. They observe an
unresolved tension between the insurance and medical care delivery aspects of mental
health care and the public safety role. The chapter convincingly shows that the specifics
of mental care merit special consideration from the economic perspective. Although parts
of the discussion in this chapter can only be appreciated fully in the US context readers
from elsewhere will recognise many of the problems considered and see these reflected in
specific arrangements for this sector in their own country.
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6. The medical care market
Part 5 deals with the functioning of medical care markets. In chapter 20, Dranove and
Satterthwaite provide a general overview of the peculiar “industrial organization” of health
care markets. Point of departure of their analysis is Arrow’s proposition that because health
care markets fail to achieve an optimal state, society will to some extent at least recognize
the gap and non-market social institutions will arise attempting to bridge it (Arrow, 1963).
However, as argued by Pauly (1978, p. 19), the problem is that we only know that such
public and private institutional arrangements might improve matters, “but it is a large step
from might to will”. What is clear, according to North (1994), is that in a world of positive
transaction costs “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially
efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interest of those
with the bargaining power to create new rules” (pp. 360–361). Obviously, this observation
holds true for the medical care sector, where the highly imperfect and unevenly distributed
information causes substantial transaction costs and unequal bargaining power. According
to Dranove and Satterthwaite, most of the studies that fall under the industrial organisation
of health care rubric can be characterised as attempts to better understand to what extent
non-market social institutions overcome the market’s basic difficulties.
Dranove and Satterthwaite focus solely on the institutional structures that are employed
to deal with the imperfections of the health care marketplace in the US. Over the last 30
years they distinguish three different institutional regimes that have successively dominated
the organisation of the US health care market: (1) independent physicians and cost-based
reimbursement for hospitals; (2) regulation; and (3) managed care. The first regime is also
labelled “patient driven competition”. Hospitals compete on the basis of quality attributes
for physicians and physicians compete on the basis of price and quality attributes for pa-
tients. The second regime is characterised by prospectively reimbursed hospitals and (in-
completely) price regulated physicians, both competing on the basis of non-price attributes.
In the third regime — managed care — payers compete on the basis of price, administrative
convenience, and the attractiveness of their provider networks while hospitals and physi-
cians compete on price and quality attributes, both for inclusion into provider networks and
for individual patients. This regime is labelled “payer driven competition”.
The authors’ main proposition is that despite the distinctiveness of these three regimes,
each can be understood through a model of monopolistic competition in which competitors
possess and can manipulate quality attributes. The authors conclude from an examination
of the theoretical arguments and a review of the empirical evidence that in each regime
providers respond to economic incentives in a manner consistent with economic theory.
However, they concede that economic theory still has no satisfactory explanation for pricing
decisions by hospitals and medical specialists in the first regime. Since hospitals facing
patient-driven competition are likely to experience price-inelastic demand, the question
remains why they did not charge much higher prices than they did. “Perhaps”, according to
the authors, “the answer lay in the fact that the vast majority of hospitals were and continue
to be non-profits”. If the non-profit status would explain pricing behaviour of hospitals,
however, then theory still cannot explain pricing decisions by medical specialists such as
surgeons, who also face a price-inelastic demand but are not constrained by non-profit
motives.
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Dranove and Satterthwaite explain the shift of regimes primarily by the growing com-
plexity and costs of medical care, which induced successive transfers of the agency role
from primary care physicians to the government and then to health plans or managed care
organisations. One can question, however, whether the third regime really replaced the sec-
ond regime or merely augmented it. The second regime only involves an institutional change
of the public sector (medicare and medicaid), while the third regime describes a subsequent
change of the private health insurance sector. Hence, health care providers currently seem
to operate in two rather than one institutional regime, one prevailing in the public and the
other in the private sector.
The authors maintain that each regime represents, for its time, a sensible response to
market failure. Yet, as is also clear from their analysis, each regime has its own weaknesses.
In the first regime, primary care physicians were imperfect agents because they were not
good price shoppers and health care costs were escalating. In the third regime, however,
managed care organisations may also turn out to be imperfect agents because they are
not good quality shoppers: if consumers do not have precise measures of quality, then
price competition gives providers incentives to cut back on quality. Quality measurement
and its translation to comprehensible consumer information is still in its infancy, although
the authors discern a growing movement to measure quality of health plans. Additional
weaknesses of the third regime, which are extensively analysed by Cutler and Zeckhauser
in chapter 11, are failures of private health insurance markets themselves, such as adverse
selection, lack of access and non-existence of intertemporal insurance.
Chapter 23 by Cullis, Jones and Propper (CJP) deals with waiting lists for medical
treatment. Although waiting lists (or waiting time) may be perceived as a mere rationing
device (deliberately used by policy makers) to reduce overall utilisation of health care and
to optimally use existing capacity, often countries struggle 3 to reduce waiting lists, in the
face of strong public pressure. The UK has a long history in fighting and (consequently)
studying waiting lists, and that is probably why three British health economists were asked
to write a chapter on waiting lists. 4
The chapter is well organised. CJP first discuss the theoretical issues related to waiting
lists, then empirical matters and finally policy issues. The theoretical section discusses
Lindsay’s demand-side approach (Lindsay, 1980) which indicates that demand will decrease
when waiting times go up and Iverson’s supply-side approach (Iverson, 1993) emphasising
the role of the supply-side in maintaining waiting lists. The authors show that waiting lists
are a complex matter and demonstrate that waiting lists are persistent due to an interaction
between supply and demand factors. Other factors, such as maintaining waiting lists by
physicians to be able to select medically interesting cases or to increase demand for private
health care, add to the complex field of interests, incentives and pressures. In the section on
empirical evidence, CJP critically review existing research both for the demand side and for
the supply side. On the demand-side the focus is on the costs of waiting, derived from market
3 A recent paper in Nature suggests that waiting lists are subject to power laws, implying that long delays (waiting
times) will be extremely difficult to eliminate (Smethurst and Williams, 2001).
4 The non-UK reader may sometimes get the idea that the chapter is quite UK-oriented, but this may also be
considered a logical result from the fact that much of the work on waiting lists is performed by British researchers
and in the British context.
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data and from contingent valuation methods. On the supply-side, there is attention for the
impact of increasing the quantity of supply (e.g. do more hospital beds reduce waiting?) 5
and inter-sectoral effects, which mainly examine the relationship between private care and
public care (e.g. do people leave the public system in favour of private care when waiting
time increases?).
Finally, the most relevant policy options in reducing waiting lists are discussed, such as
demand rationing, supply expansion, subsidies to reduce waiting and encouraging private
provision of health care. There is also attention for policies aimed at managing waiting lists.
When the battle against waiting lists cannot be won, or when waiting lists are considered to
be helpful in rationing health care, policy makers may use prioritisation of persons on waiting
lists and reducing uncertainty of waiting for patients to make waiting less problematic.
An aspect that the authors could have emphasised more is the relationship between
equity and waiting lists. Questions about equal access to health care can be important when
discussing the stimulation of private health care or the prioritisation of patients. In private
care, one allows high income groups to leave the public system, thus creating inequality
in health care utilisation based on income, which may be considered undesirable. When
prioritising patients on waiting lists according to productive possibilities, a similar inequity
will occur. In The Netherlands, there is resistance both to allowing private health care
facilities offering normal care outside the public system and to giving priority to certain
groups based on potential loss of production (see Brouwer and Schut, 1999).
More research on waiting lists and waiting times is needed, also in terms of international
comparisons. One would have expected an overview of health care systems with consider-
able waiting lists and the amount of time a patient has to wait on average. Such information
is, however, simply not available. Until we can produce these basic figures (in a comparable
way), really understanding the dynamics of waiting lists and the factors that influence them
will prove extremely difficult. Reducing waiting times hence will inevitably take form of
trial and error, as can be observed in many countries. CJP rightfully conclude that despite
the considerable range of work on waiting lists and related matters, ‘knowledge of these
issues is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind’.
Chapter 25 by Scherer is on the pharmaceutical industry. The market for pharmaceutical
products is one of the most international as incentives to take advantage of unique and ex-
clusive product franchises are very strong. As competition increased and drug development
became much more expensive (partly pushed by regulation) a merger wave took place in
1980s and 1990s. Regulation plays a major role in this market from 1962 onwards (partly
triggered by the thalidomide disaster). Some studies suggest that the FDA and other reg-
istration authorities induced a major welfare loss because of postponed availability of new
effective drugs. Others suggest that these developments pushed industries to target their
R&D on drugs of higher effectiveness making them also more successful in less regulated
markets (compare Japan with a weak regulatory system and low performance of domestic
companies). Scherer suggests that it is difficult to assess the pros and cons of different
extents of regulation in this market. In that respect, one may even consider for instance
regulation merely requiring appropriate testing and disclosure of test data or abandoning
the requirement of physicians’ prescriptions. More severe regulation clearly imposes costs,
5 Much attention is paid to the important study by Martin and Smith (1999).
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but it is difficult to estimate its benefits. This discussion is even more important when
considering patent protection world-wide, which may slightly increase the number of new
drugs but leads to tremendous welfare losses in low-income countries provoking the recent
discussions on property rights and court cases as in South Africa.
Pricing by manufacturers of branded and generic drugs is discussed as well as governments’
attempts to cut costs such as stimulation of generic substitution and profits and price con-
trols. Also market demand-side reactions by HMOs and pharmacy benefit management
firms appear to have been successful in the US to get considerable discounts on wholesale
list prices. An omission in the chapter is that the so-called fourth hurdle of requiring proof
of cost-effectiveness from the manufacturer of a new drug as a way to inform pharmaceu-
tical reimbursement policy is not discussed. Started in Australia and Canada this system,
which makes extensive use of the expanding area of pharmacoeconomics, is now rapidly
diffusing in Europe where already six countries have introduced it or plan to do so soon
(Drummond et al., 1999). Also the development in the UK, where the National Institute for
Clinical Excellence provides guidance on the use of new technologies, has a major impact
on pharmaceutical markets in Europe. This fourth hurdle may further target R&D efforts,
it adds to the regulation and the burden of proof for new products, and has the potential of
bringing about a major change in the pharmaceutical market comparable to the introduction
of registration in the early 1960s. And it is one of the clearest opportunities for a strong role
for health economics in health policy.
7. Law and regulation
In the seventh part of the handbook three chapters are grouped together under the heading
“law and regulation”. The scope of the chapters is much narrower than the broad title
suggests. They deal with the effects of malpractice legislation, antitrust legislation and
the regulation of prices and investment in hospitals and focus entirely on the US health
care system. We concentrate on antitrust enforcement in health care, which may be of
increasing importance outside the US because of market-oriented health care reforms in a
number of countries. In chapter 27, Gaynor and Vogt review issues relating to antitrust and
competition in health care markets. Since antitrust analysis requires knowledge of health
insurance and health care markets it is not surprising that there is a substantial overlap
with the chapters by Cutler and Zeckhauser (chapter 11) and Dranove and Satterthwaite
(chapter 20).
After a brief review of US antitrust legislation, Gaynor and Vogt discuss whether and how
health care is different from other industries in ways that affect the optimality of competi-
tion. The economic rationale for antitrust enforcement is to safeguard competition because
perfect competition maximizes social welfare. Since perfect competition in health care mar-
kets is not feasible due to uncertainty and informational asymmetries that are inherent in
the nature of medical care, the question is whether there is an economic justification for
antitrust policy in health care. The authors explain that the answer to this question is not
straightforward, since the effects of competition in health care crucially depend on the in-
stitutional structure. For instance, in the absence of price responsive buyers and cost-based
reimbursement for hospitals — denoted by Dranove and Satterthwaite as patient-driven
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competition — competition among hospitals may result in a wasteful medical arms race.
In a review of the court decisions in hospital merger cases, Gaynor and Vogt point out
that in 4 of the 12 cases, hospital mergers were allowed because courts found that they
would reduce wasteful non-price competition. By contrast, in the presence of highly price
responsive managed care plans — denoted by Dranove and Satterthwaite as payer-driven
competition — competition may result in too low levels of quality, if adequate information
about quality is lacking. In such a situation, vigorous antitrust enforcement may result in
sub-optimal resource allocation. Another problem for antitrust enforcement in health care
is that market conduct and pricing behavior by non-profit hospitals are not well understood.
Merging non-profit hospitals often argue that their non-profit status makes it unlikely that
they will exercise any market power. Gaynor and Vogt show that courts are quite sensitive to
this argument and that in the last decade the only hospital merger case won by the antitrust
authorities was a case where both hospitals were for profit.
Gaynor and Vogt particularly focus on three main areas in which antitrust policy has been
applied to health care: hospital mergers, monopsony and foreclosure. They explicate that
the theoretical and empirical literature in those areas suffers from serious shortcomings.
For instance, they make clear that the choice of market definition in hospital merger cases
lacks sufficient theoretical and empirical justification. In addition, they discuss a number of
weaknesses of the price-concentration studies about hospital mergers and hospital compe-
tition. In both cases they develop alternative theoretical approaches, but the practical use of
these approaches is limited because sufficient data are lacking. This brings the authors to the
modest conclusion that “much remains to be understood about competition and antitrust
in health care”. Of course, such a conclusion is not very comforting for those currently
involved in antitrust enforcement in the health care sector.
8. Health habits
Chapter 29 by Chaloupka and Warner gives a broad overview of the research on the
economics of smoking. It has four main themes: the impact of cigarette price on demand,
taxation and the social costs of smoking, advertising and tobacco control policies and the
macroeconomic importance of the tobacco industry.
The chapter shows clearly that a substantial amount of research is focused on estimating
the price-elasticity of the demand for cigarettes and attempts to explain smoking decisions
in an economic framework. The majority of recent estimates for the price-elasticity of
overall cigarette demand appear to be in the range of−0.3 to−0.5. Recent studies seem to
confirm that the price sensitivity of cigarette demand is inversely related to age, so younger
people are more sensitive to changes in price. The authors discuss several types of economic
addiction models. The rational addiction model predicts that younger, less educated, and
lower income persons will be more responsive to price; older, more educated, and higher
income persons will be more responsive to new information on the health consequences of
smoking. Studies using US data seem to confirm these predictions, but for other countries
little empirical support is found. Criticism of the rational addiction model concentrates on
the assumption of perfect foresight and suggests that rationality is more bounded and that
people often underestimate the probability to get addicted and may regret past decisions.
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The authors cite behavioural economic studies suggesting that the price-elasticity of demand
is not constant but rises as the price of cigarettes rises.
The authors then discuss taxation and social costs of smoking. Cigarette taxes seem
to be very regressive because taxes are flat and smoking prevalence is generally higher
among lower income people. The public health community advocated large increases in
tax, reasoning that smokers should cover the social costs of smoking and that taxation
will discourage many (young) people from smoking, through the price effect. Most studies
on the social costs of smoking use an attributable risk methodology, applied to disease
prevalence and the human capital approach. Some more recent studies adopted an incidence
approach and a life time perspective. It is interesting that Chaloupka and Warner point to
the failure of studies to consider how smoking may complicate the course of many illnesses
(such as diabetes) that are not directly associated with smoking. Some authors state that
smoking may have some economic benefits such as reduction in social security payments
and medical expenditures avoided due to smokers’ premature death. The question is whether
such negative costs should be included in the calculations (for example: to what extent are
these real costs or transfer payments). This is now under debate. It is disappointing that
the chapter does not discuss the issue of cost-effectiveness of medical and non-medical
anti-smoking programs.
It is shown that in general, research produces no clear consensus concerning the effects
of advertising on smoking. Advertisement bans only seem to have a temporary reduction
effect, probably because effective alternative media were developed in response. However,
some study results suggest that serious restrictions which are comprehensively enforced,
combined with anti-smoking publicity, may lead to permanent reductions in cigarette de-
mand.
Macroeconomic analyses of the contribution of the tobacco industry to the economy sug-
gest that even within the most prominent US tobacco growing states, the consequences for
regional employment would be limited if the industrial activities were curtailed. Alternative
spending would generate as much employment as spending on tobacco. With respect to the
balance of payments of countries, the consequences are only not negligible for nations such
as Zimbabwe where tobacco is a very prominent element in export.
Chapter 31 by Kenkel is on prevention. The choice to present this chapter in a section on
health habits, is explained by defining prevention as ranging ‘from medical decisions such
as vaccinations . . . to private lifestyle decisions such as regular exercise and non-smoking’.
As Kenkel indicates, such a broad scope makes it necessary to choose a focus. He does so
by focusing on prevention in developed countries (especially the USA), largely ignoring the
specific issues in prevention in developing countries. He furthermore confines the chapter
to prevention normally associated with health care (leaving out for instance environmental
economics and transport economics that also have ‘preventive’ elements) and to work per-
formed by health economists, leaving out work from other disciplines on prevention that
may be relevant for health economists.
In the main part of the chapter Kenkel discusses what prevention means in health economic
models, discussing human capital models, insurance models and the supply of prevention.
The most elaborately discussed human capital models emphasise the role of schooling,
time preference, initial stock of health and age in the demand for prevention. Kenkel elab-
orates on the important issue of moral hazard in relation to prevention. The main question
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is whether having insurance will lead to a reduction in prevention, due to ex ante moral
hazard (changing behaviour before actually ill, engaging in more risky and less preventive
behaviour), because the price of subsequent medical care consumption is lowered through
insurance. As Kenkel discusses, moral hazard may lead to a reduction in preventive ac-
tions performed by the individual. However, insurance of preventive medicine may also
lead to an increase in consumed prevention. In discussing the extent of the moral hazard
problem, Kenkel presents a table with results from logit models showing the (standard-
ised) relationship for men and women between health insurance and life-style factors such
as obesity, smoking, drunk driving and breast examinations. From this, no strong indica-
tion for ex ante moral hazard can be derived (the only odd ratio significantly higher than
1 indicated an increased chance for men with insurance to be obese), but Kenkel right-
fully argues that this evidence should be interpreted cautiously, because unobserved vari-
ables, like risk aversion, may have influenced these results. Kenkel furthermore describes
other market failures that may lead to too little prevention: the existence of externalities,
a lack of consumer information and underinvestment in the development of new preven-
tive medicine. Governments may try to stimulate prevention in response to these market
failures.
Kenkel also addresses the question of cost-effectiveness of prevention, without much
elaboration on some controversies in cost-effectiveness analysis that are especially relevant
for prevention. Given the rather narrow discussion of cost-effectiveness by Garber in chapter
4, such elaboration would have been welcome. Also lacking is a discussion of whether or not
discounting future health effects (at the same rate as costs) is appropriate for the assessment
of preventive medicine. Such a procedure makes it inherently difficult for prevention (with
present costs and effects often in the far future) to be labelled as cost-effective. Some
authors have argued against equal discount rates for costs and effects (e.g. van Hout, 1998),
which can have great implications for the cost-effectiveness of prevention. Some policies
to encourage prevention are highlighted, such as subsidies, improving access to preventive
medicine and information dissemination.
9. Health
Chapter 32 by Dolan is on a central topic in health care resource allocation decisions,
the description and valuation of health-related quality of life (HRQoL). The chapter gives
an overview of the methodological advances that have been made in this field, particu-
larly over the past two decades. Dolan defines the benefits that a patient derives from a
particular health care intervention as enhanced quality and/or length of life. Hence, the
focus is on cost utility analysis rather than cost benefit analysis in which option values and
non-use values are also important. The common model to combine quality and length of
life is the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) model, which Dolan takes as the starting
point of his analysis. To estimate QALYs, quality weights must be attached to HRQoL.
Dolan presents a convincing case that these quality weights should be based on individual
preferences.
The chapter is structured around six central questions. In “What is to be valued?”, Dolan
compares approaches based on the valuation of sequences of health states, such as Mehrez
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and Gafni’s (1989) healthy-years equivalent (HYE), and approaches based on the valua-
tion of separate health states, such as QALYs. The former approach is more general, the
latter more tractable. Which approach should be preferred depends ultimately on the va-
lidity of the preference axioms that are imposed. Dolan argues that the most problematic
QALY assumption is separability over time. Evidence suggests that people take account
of future health states when valuing current health. The theoretical properties of QALYs
and of HYEs have led to a vigorous debate in the literature. Several contributions to the
QALY–HYE debate were misdirected which has led to considerable confusion. Unfortu-
nately, Dolan does not resolve this confusion completely due to some inaccuracies in his
theoretical analysis. For example, on p. 1730 Dolan first writes, wrongly, that Miyamoto
and Eraker’s (1985) model is consistent with any risk posture and four lines further he
writes, correctly, that their model requires constant proportional risk posture. “How is it to
be described?” discusses the relative merits of disease-specific and generic descriptions of
health. Dolan argues that generic measures are needed to inform resource allocation deci-
sions across a range of diverse interventions. “How is it to be valued?” is on the three most
commonly used methods to value health states: the visual analogue scale (VAS), the time
tradeoff (TTO), and the standard gamble (SG). Dolan prefers the latter two because they are
choice-based. He sees neither theoretical nor empirical grounds to choose between SG and
TTO, although “the benefit of the doubt might be given to the TTO” (p. 1746). “Who is to
value it?” presents in a balanced way arguments why patients should value health states (ex-
perience) and counterarguments why the general public should value health states (they are
the ones to benefit). Empirical evidence shows that experience with illness leads to higher
health state valuations. Hence, the question is an important one for resource allocation
decisions.
It is in practice impossible to value all health states and some interpolation is neces-
sary. “How are values for all health states to be generated?” compares two approaches to
interpolation. In the decomposed approach, dimensions of health states are valued sepa-
rately and then combined into an aggregate score through a multiattribute utility function.
In the composite approach, a subset of composite health states is valued and the values
of the remaining health states are interpolated through econometric techniques. Little evi-
dence exists on which approach is to be preferred. “How are valuations to be aggregated?”
deals with the question which measure of central tendency should be used in the aggre-
gation of valuations. For less severe and more severe health states, the distribution of
valuations is often skewed and the choice of measure of central tendency can have an
important impact on the aggregate value. This is, however, a largely unexplored area of
research.
Dolan concludes with a research agenda. He argues that the main challenge is to un-
derstand the nature of preferences for health. Dolan pleads for a “philosophy of partial
perspective” in which more emphasis is put on interactive preference elicitations. This is
based on the idea that preferences are often constructed on the spot and therefore liable to
inconsistencies.
Dolan gives an accurate and very useful overview of the state-of-the-art in health utility
measurement. The chapter contains many insightful observations, reflecting Dolan’s wide
experience in the field. The chapter is easily accessible, also for non-specialists, and is likely
to serve as a source of reference for research and teaching purposes alike.
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10. Equity
In chapter 34 Wagstaff and van Doorslaer provide an overview of the economic literature
on equity in health care financing and in the delivery of health care. Equity is considered
within the context of a health care system and the authors indicate that the focus is ‘on
empirical work, especially that involving international and temporal comparisons’. The
chapter provides the reader with both an indication of how to measure inequity and of the
results when measuring these inequalities in different countries. It does not provide a welfare
economic basis for the measurements, however. The main part of the chapter starts out with
an informative and useful discussion of the question what equity entails. This is not merely
an introductory section, but sorts out and discusses the different concepts used in the field
of equity, such as altruism, social justice, access, receipt or consumption of health care and
need and finally works towards applicable definitions of concepts in empirical research as
well as justifying the choices made therein.
In the first empirical section, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer give an extensive discussion
of equity in health care finance. They discuss vertical equity as well as horizontal equity, 6
first how it should be measured theoretically and subsequently the results from empirical
research in this area. Measuring equity in health care financing is interesting, but it is
not entirely clear what the results implicate. Note that health care financing is only one
aspect of the total redistribution of income in a country. When total income redistribution
is considered equitable, while having a regressive health care financing system, should we
then be concerned with the latter? There seems to be a challenge in meaningfully relating
the progressivity of health care financing to the total income distribution.
Then Wagstaff and van Doorslaer discuss equity in health care utilisation. Here, again a
nice balance between a theoretical outline and empirical results has been struck. The section
provides the reader with a thorough overview of the progression made in this research
area. Methods used are increasingly refined and improved, for instance by using indirect
standardisation instead of direct standardisation and consequently, results appear to be
increasingly reliable (e.g. Gerdtham et al., 1999). One of the remaining problems in this
research area is that the standardisation of health care utilisation does not include the type of
disease. This may be relevant when disease patterns differ systematically between income
groups and when the relationship between medical need and health care utilisation differs
for disease patterns (depending on the availability and costs of treatments).
Finally, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer discuss equality of health, especially related to
socioeconomic status. This concept of equality is more fundamental than the earlier two,
but in that respect also less directly related to the health care sector. Indeed, as indicated
in the chapter, equality of health seems an unattainable goal to which health care can only
moderately contribute. The section mainly focuses on the contributions made by economists
to this field (understandably) leaving out a vast amount of literature on socioeconomic
inequalities in health from other disciplines.
6 Vertical equity refers to the wish that persons with different incomes contribute differently to the health care
system (i.e. those with higher incomes contribute more than those with lower incomes), while horizon equity refers
to the wish that persons with equal incomes contribute equally to health care.
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Overall, the chapter by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer is well-balanced. The chapter is not
as accessible as some of the other chapters in the handbook (first year masters students —
the intended readership of the handbook — may have difficulties in using this chapter as a
practical guide in performing research in this area), but the consistently followed structure
of theoretical outlines followed by empirical results is very clear and enables the authors
in empirical sections to refer back to the theoretical sections and indicate what exactly is
being measured. The chapter clearly demonstrates what progress has been made in this
field especially in terms of methods and what problems remain to be solved. Hopefully,
such progress can also be made in finding reliable and comparable data across different
countries.
Chapter 35 by Williams and Cookson is on equity in health. The chapter gives an overview
of the implications of various philosophical theories of justice for the way in which a welfare
economist might appraise a particular distribution of health. Or, in the words of the authors:
“what we are attempting here is the brutal task of forcing high-minded philosophical theories
about distributive justice into the procrustean bed of welfare economics”. The focus of the
chapter is on health, measured by QALYs. The analysis is built on the assumption that health
is the sole argument in the social welfare function. The authors acknowledge that this is
a strong assumption and that it denies the opportunity to study tradeoffs between health
and other desirable things. However, health is an essential ingredient for every individual’s
well-being, so treating it as the primary concern of public policy is defensible.
The main part of the chapter presents a taxonomy of theories depending on the nature of
the objective function, the nature of the opportunity set, and the presence of side conditions
on health outcomes. Discussed theories include among others utilitarianism (linear objec-
tive function, unrestricted opportunity set, unrestricted outcomes), Williams’ (1997) fair
innings approach (non-linear but smooth objective function, unrestricted opportunity set,
unrestricted outcomes), the principle that there should be equality of access (unrestricted ob-
jective function, restricted opportunity set, unrestricted outcomes) and an extended version
of Rawls’ maximin rule (non-linear and kinked objective function, restricted opportunity
set, and restricted outcomes).
When equity principles involve a maximand, then there is a role to play for economists. In
that case, economists can contribute to the specification and estimation of a social welfare
function which can help to enlighten the public policy process by making clear the tradeoff
between equity and efficiency. The final part of the chapter discusses the research that
has sought to quantify the equity–efficiency tradeoff in health. The literature is still at an
embryonic stage. Most studies have difficulty to distinguish between equity and efficiency
considerations. The little evidence that exists suggests that people are willing to sacrifice
QALY gains for a more equitable distribution. We are still a long way from a well-specified
social welfare function though. The authors conclude that a major challenge for future
research is to “find a way of translating people’s considered preferences about equity in
health into measurements”.
The main contribution of the chapter is the proposed taxonomy of theories. This taxon-
omy should help both researchers and policy makers to clarify their thinking about equity
principles in health. The part on the estimation of the equity–efficiency tradeoff is somewhat
disappointing, in particular with respect to the specification of the social welfare function.
Here, the authors limit discussion to the fair innings approach and the DALY concept and
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ignore other important contributions, most notably by Wagstaff’s (1991). The authors also
ignore the more basic problem whether a social welfare function can be specified at all, i.e.
whether and to what extent it is possible to aggregate QALYs over individuals in a mean-
ingful way. These omissions are unfortunate because the specification of the social welfare
function is a field par excellence where health economists can contribute by discussing the
possibility of aggregating individual health or utility and by identifying the assumptions on
which the various specifications rest.
11. Conclusion
By discussing the 18 chapters above we hope to have given the reader a fair impression
of the wealth of the material in this book. The editors must be complimented for bringing
together the peers in health economics and getting them to deliver comprehensive and
accessible descriptions of the state-of-science in each of their areas of expertise. We think
that this achievement marks the maturity of the field of health economics and provides an
excellent overview of its current status.
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